Introduction
A recent Supreme Court decision (Kelo v. New London) has e¤ectively given communities the green light for private takings, where local and state governments have the authority to condemn private property for other private use. The ruling is controversial. Some observers believe the use of eminent domain in the Kelo case does not ful…l the public use criterion as stated in the …fth amendment to the U.S. constitution: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation" (my emphasis). They also might point out that the recent ruling seems to contradict an earlier Court ruling (Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midki¤ ): "A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void ... The court's cases have repeatedly stated that 'one person's property may not be taken for the bene…t of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid,'."Other observers, however, believe that Kelo ruling is fully consistent with both the constitution and previous Court decisions. The Holmes Court ruled in 1925 what constitutes public use should be determined by state legislatures; so if legislatures deem that economic development of private property by private agents provides bene…ts to the community at large-due to, say, higher employment levels and tax base-then such a taking ful…ls the public use criterion as stated in the constitution. Proponents of the Kelo ruling would point out that the Supreme Court had no choice but to rule for the City of New London since the taking was motivated by the public bene…ts associated with economic development.
From a public policy prospective, attempting to assess whether a taking is "appropriate" by determining whether or not it ful…ls the public use criterion in the constitution seems almost pointless: given the way the Court has interpreted public use, "almost anything goes"in the sense that if a state government claims that there is a public bene…t associated with a taking, then there is a public bene…t associated with the taking. A more meaningful and relevant exercise would be assess the social welfare implications associated with takings along the lines of Kelo, i.e., where the government takes property from one private agent and gives it to another (assuming, of course, that the former receives just compensation). In this paper I present a model where a developer has the opportunity to redevelop private property that is currently owned by another private party, a landowner. The developer can obtain the property rights from the landowner directly-by purchasing the property rights from the landowner-or indirectly-by having the government take the landowner's property rights, subject to providing the landowner with just compensation. When the landowner purchases the property rights directly from the landowner, the price of the property rights is determined as a outcome to a bargaining problem; when the government takes the property from the landowner, the landowner receives the market value of the taken property, which is paid for by the developer. Compared to various bargaining schemes, the use of eminent domain always distorts the landowner's 1 property investment away from what is e¢ cient.
I consider two di¤erent bargaining schemes when the developer directly purchases property rights from landowners. In one scheme I assume that the developer has a …xed bargaining weight, independent of how many landowners he bargains with. In this situation, the use of eminent domain to transfer property always lowers social welfare compared to bargaining. This scheme, however, may su¤er from a shortcoming. Some commentators have pointed out that when a developer agent attempts purchase a number of properties for a project, he may be subject to the holdout problem, i.e., potential sellers will withhold their property in an attempt to obtain a larger surplus. In fact, it has been suggested that the use of eminent domain can be interpreted as the government's solution to this holdout problem. A bargaining scheme that has a developer with a …xed bargaining weight e¤ectively assumes away the holdout problem. I, therefore, consider an alternative bargaining scheme that has the bargaining weight of the developer declining with the number of landowners he bargains with. Such a bargaining scheme can be interpreted as embodying a notion of the holdout problem. I …nd that even when the holdout problem present, the use of eminent domain to transfer property rights may lower social welfare. The holdout problem has to be "signi…cant" if the use of eminent domain is to have any social value.
The seminal economics paper on eminent domain and takings is Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1984) . This paper, and the rather sizeable literature that follows it, focus on the issue of compensation in an environment where the condemned property is converted into a public good. The takings literature that addresses the condemnation of private property for other private use is extremely small. Rolnik and Davies (2006) and Garrett and Rothstein (2007) , relying on solid economic reasoning, point out that when governments interfere with the market place, bad outcomes usually follow. Both of these discussions, however, are not conducted within the context of an explicit model.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section considers a simple redevelopment-takings environment with one developer and one landowner. In section 3, this environment is extended to one of a single developer and many landowners. The …nal section concludes.
A Simple Model with One Landowner
There is a single landowner who is endowed with capital K`and property rights to a tract of land. The landowner can invest his capital in two ways. He can invest in a safe asset that provides a gross rate of return R and he can make an irreversible investment x K`on his land, which gives a payo¤ of f (x), where f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0 and f 0 (0) > R. A developer is endowed with capital K d . He can redevelop the landowner's land and invest in the safe asset. If land is redeveloped, the investment x-and therefore, potential payo¤ f (x)-is destroyed. Let y represent the amount spent on redevelopment by the developer. There are two states of the world for redevelopment: a good state and a bad state. The probability that the state is good is 1 . In the good state, redevelopment spending y y generates a payo¤ of Y and spending y < y gives a zero payo¤. In the bad state, any expenditure y 0 gives a zero payo¤.
In order to redevelop land, the developer must acquire the property rights from the landowner. If he purchases these rights directly from the landowner, then the purchase price, p, is determined by bargaining and is given by the solution to the generalized Nash bargaining problem. The developer's generalized Nash bargaining weight is denoted by , where 0 < < 1, and the landowner's bargaining weight is 1 . Since 0 < < 1, both the landowner and the developer have some bargaining power.
There exists a government that can condemn and expropriate, i.e., take, the landowner's property. When the government revokes the landowner's property rights, it sells them to the developer. The law requires the government provide "just compensation" to the landowner in the event that his land is taken. In this article, just compensation will be de…ned as f (x)-the value of the property to the landowner in the event that his property is not taken. One can interpret a taking as essentially by-passing the bargaining process between the developer and landowner. The government must balance its budget. Hence, if land is taken, the government sells the property rights to the developer for f (x).
The timing of events is as follows. At date 0, the landowner is born; he invests x in his property and K` x in the safe asset. In between dates 0 and 1, the state of world-good or bad-is revealed. At date 1, the developer is born; he decides whether or not to redevelop the landowner's property. In the event that the redevelopment takes place either the developer bargains with the landowner or the government takes the landowner's property rights and sells them to the developer. In either case, the developer spends either p or f (x) (at date 2) to acquire the property rights, where he spends p if the he bargains with the landowner and f (x) if he gets the property rights, via eminent domain, from the government. The developer invests (K d y) in the safe asset if he obtains the property rights to the land; otherwise he invests K d in the safe asset. At date 2 all investments pay o¤, payments are exchanged and the landowner and developer consume.
The objective of the landowner and the developer is to maximize their expected payo¤s. The timing of the births of a landowner and the developer prevents them from interacting before the landowner makes his investment decision. This timing assumption is designed to re ‡ect the real world fact that developers enter the scene long after initial investments are undertaken. 
Social Optimum
At date 0, the landowner invests x in his property. With probability , the state of the world is bad and it is not e¢ cient to redevelop the land. In this situation the payo¤ to the landowner is f (x) + (K` x) R and the payo¤ to the developer is K d R. With probability (1 ), the state is good and it will be e¢ cient to redevelop the land only if the total payo¤ to redevelopment, Y + (K d y) R + (K` x) R, exceeds the payo¤ to not redeveloping the land,
De…ne a critical level of investment in land, x c , as
If x x c , then it is e¢ cient to redevelop the land in the good state; if x > x c , then it is not. To make the redevelopment problem interesting, I will assume the e¢ cient level of investment in land-described below-is strictly less than x c . If the e¢ cient level of investment in land is greater than x c , then redevelopment never socially optimal.
The e¢ cient level of investment in land is determined by the solution to
i.e., the e¢ cient level of investment in land maximizes total expected payo¤ to society. The e¢ cient level of investment in land, x , is given by the …rst-order condition to (1), i.e.,
The social optimum is characterized by:
1. the landowner investing x at date 0;
2. the developer spending y on redevelopment in the good state; and 3. no redevelopment in the bad state.
Redevelopment Under Bargaining
The developer has no incentive to obtain property rights in the bad state. In the good state, the (date 2) payo¤ to the developer when he does obtain property rights is (Y yR p) and (date 2) the payo¤ to the landowner is (p f (x)). Note that the developer spends y = y for redevelopment. At the time of bargaining, the investment x is sunk for the landowner but the investment y for the developer is not; this is why the term " yR"shows up in the developer's payo¤ function and there is no comparable term in the landowner's payo¤ function. De…ne the total surplus associated with redevelopment in the good state as S (x), where
> 0-or equivalently x < x c -then the developer will want to redevelop the land; if S (x) 0-or equivalently x x c -then he will not. If S (x) > 0, then the price that the developer pays for the landowner's property rights, p, is given by the solution to
Suppose …rst that the landowner believes (correctly) that S (x) 0 for his choice of x; then the optimal investment in his property is given by the solution to
Note that the landowner's objective function can be rewritten as
The solution, x B , is characterized by
where "B" stands for "bargaining."Comparing (4) with (2), note that x B > x ; the landowner's investment in his property is larger than what is socially optimal. Suppose now the landowner believes (correctly) that S (x) < 0 for his choice of x; then his optimal investment investment is given by the solution to
The solution of (5) is characterized by
where the "N " stands for "no bargaining."Comparing (4) with (6), note that
If S (x N ) > 0, i.e., x N < x c , then the developer will always redevelop the landowner's land in the good state. If S (x N ) > 0, then the relevant problem for landowner is (3) and he invests x B .
If S (x B ) < 0, i.e., x B > x c , then developer will never redevelop the landowner's property and relevant problem is given by (5). Hence, the landowner invests x N and no redevelopment takes place.
Finally, if S (x B ) > 0 and S (x N ) < 0, then landowner's level of investment will determine whether or not there will be redevelopment in the good state. That is, if the landowner believes that redevelopment will occur, then he will invest x B and redevelopment will occur in the good state. If he believes that redevelopment will not occur, then he will invest x N and in the good state, the developer will have no incentive to redevelop the landowner's land. How much will the landowner invest at date 0, x B or x N ? While one might be tempted to conjecture that the landowner will invest x B , since the surplus associated with investment x B is greater than investment x N , the landowner may actually invest x N . This possible outcome is a feature associated with generalized Nash bargaining: the generalized Nash bargaining solution is not monotonic, which implies that although total surplus increases, the landowner's expected share (and payo¤) decreases. So although S (x B ) > 0 and S (x N ) < 0, it may be the case that
Therefore, if S (x B ) > 0 and S (x N ) < 0 and condition (7) holds, then the landowner will invest x N ; if condition (7) does not hold, then he will invest x B . Note that there are ine¢ ciencies associated with redevelopment via bargaining, compared to the social optimum. First, the landowner always "overinvests" in his property since x N > x B > x . Second there may be too little redevelopment. In the social optimum, it is always e¢ cient to redevelop in the good state. If S (x B ) < 0, then redevelopment will never occur under bargaining; and if S (x B ) > 0, S (x N ) < 0and condition (7 holds, then redevelopment will not occur under bargaining.
Eminent Domain
Under eminent domain, a government can take the landowner's property but must provide "just compensation,"f (x), to the landowner. The government then sells the property rights to the developer for f (x). In terms of the model, eminent domain can be interpreted as giving all of the bargaining power to the developer since the landowner does not receive any of the surplus associated with redevelopment.
Proposition 1 Using eminent domain to transfer property rights never increases but can decrease social welfare compared to bargaining.
Proof. If the level of landlord investment, x, is such that redevelopment will occur in the good state, i.e., x < x c , then social welfare can be written as
If landlord investment is such that redevelopment does not occur in the good state, i.e., x x c , then social welfare is given bỹ
Note that if the landowner optimally chooses x = x B under bargaining, then necessarily, redevelopment occurs under bargaining. Under eminent domain, the landowner will always receive a payo¤ of f (x) + (K` x) R, independent of the redevelopment outcome, which means that he will always invests x N . When x = x N , redevelopment may or may not occur under eminent domain depending on whether x N < x c or x N x c , respectively. Hence, if x N < x c , we have
There are a number of cases to consider:
1. If S (x B ) < 0, then redevelopment does not take place under bargaining and the landowner invests x N ; in this case, eminent domain and bargaining generate the same level of welfare.
2. If S (x N ) > 0, then under bargaining the landowner invests x B and redevelopment occurs in the good state. Under eminent domain, the landowner invests x N and the developer redevelops in the good state. In this case, the overinvestment problem is exacerbated under eminent domain, compared to bargaining-since x N > x B > x ; here social welfare is lower under eminent domain compared to the bargaining since W (x B ) > W (x N ).
3. If S (x B ) > 0 and S (x N ) < 0 and condition (7) does not hold, then under bargaining, the landowner will invest x B and redevelopment will occur in the good state. In this case, welfare is W (x B ). Under eminent domain, the landowner will invest x N > x c > x B ; there will be too much investment and too little redevelopment. In this case welfare isW (x N ). SinceW (x N ) < W (x B ), the use of eminent domain strictly lowers welfare. If, however, S (x B ) > 0 and S (x N ) < 0 and condition (7) holds, then the landowner will invest x N under both eminent domain and bargaining. Social welfare will be the same under bargaining and eminent domain.
From all of this we can conclude that the use of eminent domain will never increase social welfare but may lower it.
Discussion
Up to this point, the analysis seems to indicate that the recent Supreme Court on Kelo v. New London is wrong-headed: eminent domain, in conjunction with just compensation, can never increase social welfare and can only lower it. Eminent domain, along with just compensation, e¤ectively gives all of the bargaining power to the developer, i.e., eminent domain and just compensation e¤ectively sets = 1 in the landowner's investment problem (3), making it equivalent to (5). It is true that, absent eminent domain, the level of landowner investment x is too high, but the use of eminent domain, along with just compensation, can only exacerbate the overinvestment problem. Not only may there be too much investment but the higher level of landowner investment may result in no redevelopment at all in the good state.
Parties who have their property taken by the government often claim that they are undercompensated. In the context of the model, if a landowner is compensated f (x) for his property rights, then there is legitimacy to the claim that he is undercompensated. In the real economy, there does not exist a market with a well-de…ned price for, say, real estate. The price for real estate is typically determined by bargaining between a seller and buyers. The purchase price of land via bargaining, p, is always strictly greater than the level of just compensation, f (x), as long as both parties to the bargain have some bargaining power, i.e.,
. So, in fact, landowner's receive a lower price for their property via eminent domain than they could have obtained by dealing directly with buyers (developers).
There are two ways that one can restore social e¢ ciency via governmental takings. One way has the government giving "more than just compensation"to the landowner. To see this, suppose that government compensates the landowner by transferring the entire (net) surplus to him. Such a scheme is equivalent to the landowner having all of the bargaining power. When the landowner has all of the bargaining power, then the landowner's decision problem is given by (3) with = 0; the solution to this problem is x = x . A second way to restore e¢ ciency is to give a …xed payment c, perhaps equal to zero, to the landowner. (In light of the results of Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1984) , this result should not be that surprising.) In this case, the landowner's investment problem is
which has the solution x = x . In practice, one would conjecture the neither one of these schemes would be implemented as a policy. An arbitrary …xed payment c would probably not pass a "just compensation"criterion. Passing a law that requires the entire net surplus associated with redevelopment be transferred away from developers to the landowners when eminent domain is used would probably not gain su¢ cient support in a legislature since, by using eminent domain, the legislature wants developers to redevelop; giving them zero surplus might have the opposite e¤ect.
A Model with Many Landowners
In the model presented in section 2, the only interesting decision problem is that of the landowner; the developer simply decides whether or not to redevelop the landowner's 8 property since the amount spent on redevelopment is essentially predetermined. In this section, we make the developer's problem more interesting and realistic by having him determine both the amount of land to redevelop and the amount to spend on redevelopment. This richer environment can be had by making only slight modi…cations to the model in section 2.
Suppose now there are N landowners, each having property rights to their own tract of land. The total value associated with property redevelopment is given by Y = F (A; y), where A represents the tracts of land or properties used for redevelopment and y is the total amount spent on redevelopment. I assume the function F (A; y) is strictly concave and increasing in both of its arguments, with F A (0; y) = F y (A; 0) ! 1 for y; A > 0.
1
The timing of events is as follows: At date 0, landowners are born and invest x in their property and K` x in the safe asset. At date 1, the developer is born; he decides how many properties he wishes to redevelop, A, and the total amount that he will spend on redevelopment, y. The developer either bargains with a set of A landowners or the government takes the landowners' property rights away from A landowners and sells them to the developer. In either case the developer spends Ap or Af (x) (at date 2) to acquire the property rights. The developer invests (K d y) in the safe asset. At date 2, all investments pay o¤, payments are exchanged and the landowners and the developer consume.
Social Optimum
Let W (x; y; A) represent the total payo¤ to society. The e¢ cient values of investment, x and y, and property redevelopment, A, are given by the solution to max x;y;A W (x; y; A) = max
All N landowners invest x in their property and the remainder of their capital in the safe asset. A total of A properties will be redeveloped. Hence, the total payo¤ to landowner investment will be (N A)f (x) and the payo¤ to redevelopment is F (A; y). The developer spends y on redevelopment, which implies that he invests (K d y) in the safe asset. The e¢ cient levels of investments, x and y, and property redevelopment, A, are by characterized by the …rst-order conditions to problem (8), i.e.,
and
Conditions (9) and (10) simply say that the expected return to investments x and y, respectively, equals the opportunity cost of capital, R. In terms of property redevelopment, condition (11), the developer continues to redevelop properties until the value last unit redeveloped equals the (social) cost of redevelopment, which is the value of the landowner's destroyed investment, f (x). I compactly denote the e¢ cient levels of investment and property redevelopment by (x ; y ; A ) :
Let A (x) denote the e¢ cient amount of land redevelopment given that (i) landowners invest x and (ii) spending on redevelopment, y, is e¢ cient, i.e., given by equation (10) . For what follows, it will be useful to diagrammatically characterize the social optimum in (x; A) space. The slope of the locus of points described by (9) is negative and is given by
Equation (9) is depicted in …gure 1 as`x; "`"for landowner. Note that the allocation (x; 0) lies on locus`x, wherex solves f 0 (x) = R. As well, since A ! N as x ! 0, allocation (0; N ) lies on locus`x. The slope of the locus of points described by equation in (11), conditional on e¢ cient redevelopment spending y, is also negative and given by dA dx
since, from (10), dy = F Ay =F yy dA and F is strictly concave. In …gure 1,`x and dd 0 loci intersect twice; social welfare is maximized at point a , where the slope of`x curve is steeper than that of the dd 0 curve. 2 Moving away from the point of intersection a = (x ; A ) along either curve`x or dd 0 unambiguously lowers social welfare. Assuming that condition (10) holds, the slope of a social welfare indi¤erence curve is given by
For allocations on the`x curve, the slope of the social welfare indi¤erence curve is zero and for allocations on the dd 0 curve, it is in…nite. A typical social welfare indi¤erence curve that intersections allocationã (whereÃ > A andx < x ) is given by the ellipse denoted SW in …gure 1. Note that for allocations that are south-east of allocation a = (x ; A ) and that lie in between (but not on) the`x and dd 0 curvessuch as allocationã-the slopes of the social welfare indi¤erence curves are all strictly positive and …nite. This implies that if two allocations lie in the cone given byxa d 0 and a line that connects the two allocations has a strictly negative slope, such as allocations a andã in …gure 1, then the allocation that has higher redevelopment, A, and lower investment, x, will generate a higher level of social welfare, i.e., the social welfare associated with allocation a exceeds that ofã in …gure 1.
Redevelopment Under Bargaining
Unless the developer plans on only redeveloping one tract of land, he must bargain with more than one landowner. Since bargaining theory does not o¤er a de…nitive approach when bargains involve more than 2 parties, I will consider two bargaining schemes. In one scheme, it is assumed that the developer has a …xed bargaining power-i.e., a …xed bargaining weight in the generalized Nash bargaining problem-, independent of how many landowners he bargains with. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that = 1=2. In the other scheme, it is assumed that the developer's bargaining power (A) falls as the number of landowners he bargains with, A, increases, i.e., 0 (A) < 0. For simplicity, I will assume that (A) = 1= (A + 1).
Fixed Bargaining Power
It is assumed that the developer's bargaining weight is = 1=2 and, if there are A landowners involved in the bargain, each landowner's bargaining weight is (1 ) =A = 1= (2A). The net surplus received by the developer if each landowner receives p for transferring his property rights to the developer is F (A; y) yR pA; the net surplus received by each of the A landowners is p f (x). The compensation p that each landowner receives for transferring their property rights to the developer is given by the solution to the multiperson generalized Nash bargaining problem,
Each landowner's investment choice is given by the solution to
The solution to this problem is given implicitly by
The developer's choice of property redevelopment, A, and spending on redevelopment, y, is given by the solution to
Given (14), the developer's problem can be rewritten as
The solution to the developer's problem is given by
Note a few things. First, the developer's choice of y and A does not depend directly on his bargaining strength; the choices do depend indirectly on bargaining strength since the landowner's choice of x depends upon on the bargaining strengths and the developer's choice variables depend on x. Second-and this is related to the …rst observation-given the amount of investment undertaken by landowners, x, the amount of property redeveloped, A, and the amount spent on redevelopment, y, are e¢ cient, i.e., compare (17) and (18) with (10) and (11), respectively. The developer will choose y and A so as to maximize total surplus since this also maximizes his share of the surplus. Diagrammatically speaking, the developer's decision is described by locus dd 0 in …gure 2, which is identical to the locus dd 0 in …gure 1. The the locus of points that describe the landowner's optimal investment decision, (16), in (x; A) space is depicted in …gure 2 as`1x. The slope of this locus is
Comparing (19) with (12), we see that locus`1x is steeper than locus`x since
From …gure 2, the equilibrium outcome a B = (x B ; A B ) is given by the lower intersection of the`1x and dd 0 curves. It is evident that when the developer and landowners bargain over the price of landowners' property rights, there will be, from a social perspective, too much investment in property, x B > x , and, as a result, too little redevelopment activity, A B < A . (The total amount of investment associated with redevelopment, y, can be higher than, lower than or equal to y , depending on the sign of F Ay .)
The equilibrium outcome a B = (x B ; A B ) di¤ers from the socially e¢ cient levels because landowners take account of the fact that if their property is purchased for redevelopment, then, through the bargaining process, the purchase price will depend positively on the amount of investment undertaken. Because of this, landowners will tend to overinvestment in their properties.
Variable Bargaining Power
Here I assume that the developer's bargaining power declines with the number of landowners he bargains with, i.e., 0 (A) < 0. I will further assume that each party to the bargain has the same bargaining power which implies that (A) = (A + 1)
1 . As in the previous section, the net surplus that the developer receives is Y (A; y) pA Ry and p f (x) is the surplus that each landowner who sells his property rights receives. The compensation p that each landowner receives for transferring their property rights to the developer is given by the solution to
and is depicted by the curve`1x in …gure 3. The slope of this locus of points in (x; A) space is
which is steeper than the planner's locus,`x, see …gure 3. 
The level of redevelopment spending, y, is e¢ cient for a given level of property redevelopment, A, i.e., equation (22). However, the amount of property that will be redeveloped, A, is no longer e¢ cient for a given x. This should not be surprising. Intuitively, the developer now faces a trade o¤ when increasing the number of properties he develops from socially ine¢ cient levels: although total surplus increases, his share of the surplus decreases. The end result is that for a given x, the developer will "under-redevelop."By under-redevelop, I mean that the level of property redevelopment, A, is less than what is e¢ cient given x, A (x), where A (x) solves equations (10) and (11). To see that there is under-redevelopment, note that equation (21) implies that, if there is under redevelopment, then
Consider now the e¤ect of a change in A on the left-hand side of (21), given that equation (22) holds, i.e.,
hence, a decrease in A will increase F A . Now consider the e¤ect of a change A on the right-hand side of (21), given that equation (22) holds, i.e.,
hence, a decrease in A will decrease the right-hand side of (22). Reducing property redevelopment from what is e¢ cient will increase the left-hand side and will reduce the right-hand side of (23). Therefore, equation (21) is characterized by a level of property redevelopment that is less than what is e¢ cient. The developer's behavior, as given by equations (21) and (22), is described in …g-ure 3 by locus d 1 d 0 1 , (the planner's decision along these dimensions is represented by locus dd 0 .) The equilibrium a B = (x B ; A B ) is characterized by the lower intersection of the d 1 d 0 1 and`1x loci. As in the case of …xed developer's bargaining strength, compared to the social optimum a = (x ; A ) landowners overinvest and the developer redevelops less than A properties. However, whereas, for a given x, the developer's level of redevelopment is e¢ cient when he has …xed bargaining strength, i.e., his redevelopment decision lies on locus dd, when he has variable bargaining strength, he under redevelops.
Intuitively, the "distance" between the dd 0 and d 1 d 0 1 loci can be interpetted as a measure of the holdout problem between the developer and the landowners. If the holdout problem is not very signi…cant, then the distance between these two loci will not be not very great; as the holdout problem worsens, the distance between the dd 
Eminent Domain
We assume, as above, that if the landowners'property rights are transferred to the developer under eminent domain, then each landowner will receive f (x) as "just compensation."
Since, under eminent domain, landowners understand that their payo¤ will be f (x) independent of whether or not their property is taken, the optimal behavior for the landowner is given by f 0 (x) = R or x =x. The locus of points that describe the landowner's optimal investment decision under eminent domain is given by`2x in both …gures 2 and 4, for, respectively, …xed and variable bargaining strengths. The developer's decision problem is to choose the level of property development, A, and spending on redevelopment, y, given that he must pay f (x) for each property redeveloped, i.e., max
The solution to this problem is
which is identical to (17) and (18), respectively (i.e., it is the same as the solution to the developer's problem when he has …xed bargaining strength and property rights are transferred via bargaining). Diagramatically speaking, solution to the the developer's decision when property is transferred via eminent domain is represented by by locus dd 0 in …gures 1, 2 and 4.
The following two propositions demonstrate that eminent domain may have some rather undesirable consequences.
Proposition 2 When the developer has …xed bargaining strength, if landowners believe that redevelopment will occur under eminent domain, then social welfare is strictly lower under eminent domain than under bargaining.
Proof. The equilibrium under bargaining, a B = (x B ; A B ), is given by the intersection of the`1x and dd 0 loci in …gure 2. The equilibrium under eminent domain, a ED = (x; A ED ), is given by the intersection of the`2x and dd 0 loci. Since social welfare unambiguously falls as one moves away from a = (x ; A ) along the dd 0 locus, the social welfare associated with allocation a B is strictly higher than that of allocation a ED .
Proposition 3 When the developer has variable bargaining strength, if landowners believe that redevelopment will occur under eminent domain, then social welfare is strictly lower under eminent domain than under bargaining unless the holdout problem is "signi…cant"; when the holdout problem is signi…cant, welfare under eminent domain exceeds that of bargaining.
Proof. The equilibrium under bargaining when there is no holdout problem is given by allocation a B = (x B ; A B ) in …gure 4, while the equilibrium under eminent domain-for either …xed or variable bargaining-is given by allocation a ED = (x; A ED ). The level of social welfare associated with the use of eminent domain is represented by the indi¤erence curve labeled SW ED . When the developer has variable bargaining strength, the equilibrium under bargaining can lie anywhere on the locus a Bx . Suppose the holdout problem is not signi…cant in that the d 1 d 
Discussion
When the bargaining power of the developer is …xed, the results regarding the use of eminent domain mirror that of the one landlord case. That is, compared to bargaining, the use of eminent domain exacerbates the landowners'overinvestment problem and social welfare is lowered. As well, the level redevelopment is also reduced. When the bargaining power of the developer is variable, it is still the case that the use of eminent domain exacerbates the overinvestment problem. If the holdout problem is not too severe, then-as with the case of a …xed bargaining power-social welfare will decrease if eminent domain is used to reallocate property rights from landlowners to the developer. If, however, the holdout problem is severe, then the use of eminent domain can actually increase social welfare, compared to bargaining.
If policy makers could reliably and costlessly observe the magnitude of the holdout problem, then the selective use of eminent domain to transfer property rights for redevelopment could be a social enhancing policy. That is, eminent domain would be used only when the holdout problem is severe; otherwise, the developer would bargain directly with landowners. Of course, the problem here is that one cannot costlessly observe the magnitude of the holdout problem. And one cannot rely on developers or landowers to inform policy makers of the extent of the holdout problem. Developers have an incentive to claim that the holdout problem is severe, since the use of eminent domain implies that property can be purchased cheaper than through direct bargaining. Landowners' would have an incentive to claim that there is no holdout problem and that they would settle for the same proposed price with anyone who wanted to purchase their property via bargaining.
In defending the state's right to take property from one private agent and give it-in exchange for just compensation-to another private agent, proponents of the Kelo decision-who are often local governments-point to the increased bene…ts associated with higher levels of redevelopment, such as employment and taxes. Although it is true that the use of eminent domain will increase the level of redevelopmentand other activities associated with it-it is not obvious that this translates into higher social welfare. For example, allocation a ED in …gure 4 has a higher level of redevelopment compared to allocation a 2 B , but a lower level of social welfare. If local goverments equate higher levels employment and tax revenue, that usually accompany higher levels of redevelopment, with a higher level of social welfare, then allowing communities to use eminent domain to promote redevelopment will lead to bad outcomes in many circumstances. In particular, local governments will use their power of eminent domain even when the holdout problem is not severe.
Conclusion
One might think that a government policy that allows developers to purchase as many properties that they want for "just"compensation would promote redevelopment and enhance social welfare. If there is no holdout problem, then such a policy would, in fact, reduce both redevelopment and welfare. When a holdout problem exists, such a policy may, indeed, promote redevelopment but it is not at all obvious that social welfare would be enhanced. Although the use of eminent domain mitigates the holdout problem, it also exacerbates landowner's overinvestment problem. If the latter e¤ect dominates the former-and this would occur if the holdout problem is not too severe-then social welfare will be reduced if local governments resort to their power of eminent domain.
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Appendix
The necessary conditions for a maximum to problem (8) are given by (9), (10) and (11). These conditions will identify a (local) maximum if the following second-order conditions are satis…ed,
Conditions (24) and (25) This condition has a nice interpretation; the …rst order conditions identify a (local) maximum if the`x curve is steeper than that of the dd 0 curve, i.e., compare (12) and (13).
To show that an equilibrium exists and is characterized by what is identi…ed in the text, consider the following example. Let f (x) = x :5 and Y (A; y) = A :4 y :4 . For these functional forms, the …rst-order conditions for problem (8) 
The decision of a landlord is given by (27) and can be rewritten as
this function is represented as`x in …gure 1. The decision of the developer is given by equations (28) and (29), which can be combined to read If N > 4K, there will be two solutions, as depicted in …gure 1. If N > 4K, then the maximum is given by allocation given by point a , since at point x the slope of thèx curve is steeper that that of the dd 0 curve, (at point b the slope of the dd 0 curve is steeper that that of the`x curve.) If N 4K, then the solution is A = N . In the text, the more interesting case of N > 4K is assumed.
